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PRIORITY-SETTING AT THE
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS TO SUPPORT IT
Richard Morgenstern*
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Setting priorities objectively is difficult at EPA because of
numerous explicit statutory prescriptions, political and public
pressures, internal bureaucratic tendencies, and deficiencies
in data and analytical methods. To bring more rationality to
this process, EPA has recently completed a study comparing
the magnitudes of the m ajor environmental problems the
agency might address. This paper describes the methods and
findings o f this study, and how it can be used at EPA to improve
overall protection o f the environment.

INTRODUCTION
I have been invited in this paper to discuss two particular
aspects of environmental policy in the United States: planning
for the future, and enforcement of environmental require
ments. I have chosen to cover only one o f these topics—plan
ning—rather than both of them.
I regard effective planning as critical to the mission of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA is pro
vided with a limited staff and budget to perform its function.
EPA can also require private industry to spend some limited
amount of money for environmental purposes. The challenge
of planning is to determine how to spend these limited re
sources for greatest effect. EPA must decide which environ
mental problems to devote attention to, and how much effort to
give to each.
* Director, Office o f Policy Analysis, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Washington, D.C.
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Once the critical planning decisions are m ade about
which problems to address, EPA then turns to a next set of de
cisions about how to address each problem on the agenda.
Whereas the strategic planning decisions must be made by the
highest officials in the agency, who have an overview o f all the
potential areas o f agency concern, the more tactical decisions
about what to do for an individual problem area can be made
by the manager o f that program area. The program manager
can decide what combination of steps— establishing new regu
latory requirements, implementing requirements, or enforc
ing against companies or others not complying with them —is
most appropriate for his program. Decisions about enforce
ment and other steps in implementing a program are made
subsequent to the planning decisions and can be delegated.
The issue I most want to discuss is how to go about setting
the agenda for an environmental agency. I suspect that the U.S.
experience in planning and priority-setting may have much
that is relevant for China. You, like us, must set priorities by
carefully balancing the requirements of laws, the wishes o f the
public, and the views of technical experts in the environmental
agency. On enforcement issues we may not have so much to
learn from each other. In our system, enforcement policy is
very dependent on the peculiarities of our laws governing each
program area. I suspect that our laws and the resulting meth
ods that are available for enforcement are very different from
yours.

PRIORITY-SETTING AT EPA
W hen the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
was established in 1970, the nation’s most pressing environ
mental problems were obvious: soot and smoke from cars and
smokestacks, and the raw sewage and chemicals from munici
pal and industrial wastewater.
Since 1970 the nation has done much to abate the most
visible forms o f pollution, but there is still much unfinished
business. Moreover, new problems have also been "discovered"
or have risen in importance, such as indoor radon, global cli
matic change from the buildup o f carbon dioxide in the at
mosphere, acid precipitation and hazardous waste. Many of
these new problems are difficult to evaluate, as they involve
slow, cumulative changes with very serious possible ultimate
effects, am idst considerable scientific uncertainty. M any
involve toxic chemicals that can cause cancer or birth defects
at levels o f exposure that are hard to detect. And many involve
p e rs is te n t co n ta m in a n ts th a t can m ove from one
environmental medium to another, causing further damage
even after controls have been applied for one medium.
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The complexity and gravity of these issues make it partic
ularly important that EPA apply its finite resources where
they w ill have the greatest effect. Choosing w hich
environmental programs to emphasize should be viewed as an
attempt to maximize health and ecological benefits from the
public and private resources the EPA can command. In theory,
the environmental agency should analyze its set of investment
opportunities and select projects proceeding down an ordered
list until a sufficient number of projects have been chosen to
exhaust the agency's budget.
Needless to say, priority-setting at EPA does not look
much like this theoretical model. A wide variety of factors
combine to make such priority-setting difficult at EPA.
One major difficulty stems from the multiple statutory
goals governing the agency. EPA adminsters nine m ajor
statutes. They contain a multitude of goals and prescriptions.
In recent legislation the goals have become extremely specific,
detailing what EPA is to do by when, and what will happen if
EPA does not do so. Occasionally, the goals conflict as when a
statute governing one environmental medium mandates con
trols that transfer pollution to another medium.
Achieving all of the statutory mandates is impossible
with the available resources. No escape is provided for—there is
no recognition that some of the goals are unlikely to be
achieved, and there is no guidance as to how to choose among
goals when all o f them can not be met. EPA is held accountable
for each missed goal, and an argument that the goal was not
achieved because the agency was working on something of
higher priority is not regarded as a valid excuse. In recent
years, in fact, the Congress seems to have distrusted EPA’s per
formance in setting priorities sufficiently so as to limit it
drastically.
This lack of appreciation in environmental statutes for
the need to set priorities is also mirrored by the diverse public
and political pressures brought to bear on the agency. Each is
aimed at a particular program—"Clean up the abandoned haz
ardous waste site in my neighborhood quickly", or "My com
pany can’t afford to comply with your proposed air pollution
control regulations", for example. Petitioners who want such
actions from EPA are not satisfied when EPA does not do what
they want because "other things are higher priority". The
homeowner worried about a nearby hazardous waste site is not
impressed when EPA responds that other sites scoring higher
on a hazard Ranking System will be cleaned up first. The in
dustrial plant manager is not satisfied when told that the pro
posed regulation abates health effects at an acceptable cost per
case avoided. There is little external appreciation for EPA's
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need, however, it is to be done, to set priorities across pro
grams.
Internal pressures also make rational priority-setting
difficult. As in all typical bureaucracies, long-established pro
grams build an internal constituency o f employees as well as
an external one. And, in an area such as environm ental
protection with a substantial technical component, existing
programs will build a critical knowledge base that can be used
to ju stify spending more on them: monitoring data, engineer
ing data on relevant control technologies, toxicological data
on relevant pollutants, etc. By contrast, a new program to deal
with an emerging environmental problem will have difficulty
making its case due to uncertainty and lack of good data.
Even if the bureaucratic, and institutional obstacles to ra
tional priority-setting did not exist, environmental priority
setting would still be extremely difficult methodologically. A
critical element in setting priorities is being able accurately to
predict and then compare the likely results o f alternative ac
tions. Impediments to doing this well in the environmental
field include:
1.
A severe lack o f knowledge about environm ental
processes. There are thousands o f potentially toxic chemicals
in commerce, and we have a toxicological understanding of
only several hundred. We know virtually nothing about their
synergistic or antagonistic effects. We know little about com
plex chem ical transform ations involving pollutants in the
atmosphere or in groundwater. We know little about the reac
tions o f entire ecosystems, as opposed to single species, to
environmental pollution. Our data bases on emissions, ambi
ent levels, exposure and uptake of pollutants are quite limited.
2.
Methodological difficulties in specifying what envi
ronmental "results" are. We can measure quantities such as
emissions or ambient concentrations, but these are not the ul
timate terms in which environmental changes should be eval
uated. We pursue environmental improvements because we
care fundamentally about human health, ecological quality
and economic values. In the area of economic values, there is
consensus over measuring results in dollar term s— in dollar
costs o f compliance and in dollar losses stemming from envi
ronmental damages. But in the other two areas—human health
and ecological quality—there is no agreement on the ultimate
units we care about. Do we care more about a low risk o f birth
defects in future generations, or about a higher incidence of
gastroenteritis among the current population? Do we care
more about episodic fish kills from pollution in rivers, or
about reproductive difficulties in birds exposed to certain pes
ticides? We don't know the answers to these questions. Even if
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we could assess the risks inherent in these events accurately,
we still would not know how to value them.
3.
Evaluation of environmental results is further com
plicated when we try to compare across fundamental values.
We cannot specify exactly what we mean by ecological quality,
nor how we should trade it off against human health or eco
nomic values. It is extremely difficult, often impossible, to find
a common denominator with which to compare disparate en
vironmental programs.
4.
Finally, projecting the results of environmental pro
grams is difficult because EPA does not ultimately implement
them. Typically, the private sector and state and local govern
ments do. In assessing programs, EPA must judge the likely
slippage between its regulatory proclamations and actions by
other governments and the private sector.
In sum, numerous factors combine to make rational pri
ority-setting very difficult at EPA. Statutory mandates and
public, political, and bureaucratic pressures discourage it.
Even absent these influences, it is difficult to manage well
without clear values and good information.
In most respects, EPA has fallen prey to these difficulties
in priority-setting. Perhaps like many other agencies, EPA's
procedures for priority-setting:
•
Are driven largely by statues. EPA spends much of its
effort in programming resources to meet goals established by
Congress. In general it is appropriate for the Congress to set
EPA's agenda. But the agency has several important advan
tages relative to the Congress that it should contribute to the
process o f setting environmental priorities: greater technical
expertise, and greater appreciation of the opportunities and
difficulties in program implementation. Based on this knowl
edge EPA should, but does not, assert more authority in prior
ity-setting. EPA should choose explicitly among competing
congressional goals when this is authorized by statute or ne
cessitated by budget constraints. EPA should seek actively to
have Congress change environmental statutes where neces
sary. Instead, though, EPA seems to look harder for more guid
ance from the Congress. EPA now commonly researches the
legislative history of statutes to divine "Congressional intent",
and tests in advance the reaction of key congressional person
nel to possible agency regulatory actions.
•
Are incremental. Priority-setting processes at EPA
focus on marginal decisions rather than on base programs. A
typical issue is whether a program should be given a small in
crease in resources, stay the same or suffer a small cut.
Marginal projects comprising each increment will be evalu
ated, but the much larger base program is not examined.
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•
Seldom involve explicit cross-program comparisons.
EPA’s priorities tend to be an aggregation of within-program
decisions. It is rare that anyone pits one program against an
other and asks which offers the best return for invested re
sources.
•
Make insufficient use of technical expertise. EPA has
substantial in-house technical expertise that is brought to bear
on specific program issues such as individual regulations. But
EPA's experts have typically not been asked for judgments be
yond those within the province o f their technical specialty, be
it toxicology, engineering, or ecology. These experts are asked
to play little role in priority-setting, where judgm ents and
opinions become critical in filling the gaps between areas of
technical knowledge.
In recent years some improvements have occurred in
EPA’s priority-setting. Perhaps most important are advances
in risk assessment techniques for human health impacts of
environmental pollutants. For cancer impacts in particular,
there is now a common denominator for comparing different
programs, and quantitative procedures for estim ating this
common denominator. These methods are generally used in
priority-setting at the margin, in helping to decide which po
tential new regulation to adopt and which to reject. Using risk
assessment and other techniques, EPA will typically calculate
the cost per cancer case avoided for each new proposed regula
tion. Applying a similar cost-effectiveness cut-off level across
all regulations provides some consistency to EPA decision
making at the margin in the human health area. (Some ob
servers argue also, though, that EPA's increasing ability to an
alyze human health effects quantitatively has caused the
agency to pay too little attention to non-quantifiable concerns
such as ecological quality.)
A ls o im p o rta n t are recen t E PA em p h ases on
"environmental results" and on strategic planning. The agency
has been revamping its internal management systems to en
courage managers to pursue ultimate environmental results
(health or ecological or economic improvements) rather than
intermediate administrative goals (e.g., issuing permits, con
ducting inspections, taking enforcement actions). For key pro
gram areas, the agency has also been improving its process for
strategic planning to achieve environmental results, and inte
grating the results of the strategic planning more forcefully
into the processes for budgeting and setting the agency's
regulatory agenda.
A final important step in improving EPA’s ability to set
priorities effectively has been a study entitled "Unfinished
Business: A Comparative Assessment o f Environmental Prob
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lems" (CAEP).* The remainder of this paper will focus on the
CAEP.
METHODOLOGY OF THE COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
PROJECT
The CAEP was an ambitious year-long project to deter
mine the comparative magnitude of the various environmen
tal problems that EPA might address. We aimed to develop a
broad picture of environmental problems in terms of the rela
tive risks to human health and the environment posed by each.
Which are the largest problems EPA might tackle; which are
smaller? In a world of limited resources, we thought this pro
file of relative risks would be a good starting point for agency
priority-setting. Other things being equal, EPA should devote
more effort to solving larger problems.
This sort of study was new for EPA. The agency has a great
deal of experience in assessing risks at stake in particular reg
ulatory approaches to controlling a single pollutant from a
single type of source. EPA also has some experience in pro
gram-wide risk assessment. EPA has, for example, completed a
study of the health risks from hazardous air pollutants, devel
oping several approaches for estimating the nationwide inci
dence of cancer from these pollutants.** But a study of the scope
of the CAEP, covering multiple sorts of risks and all environ
mental programs, was novel. In conducting the project, we or
ganized and limited our work in four important ways.
First, we divided the universe of environmental problems
into 31 pieces. Each of the pieces represents an environmental
problem area defined along lines corresponding generally with
existing programs or statutes. For example, some o f our 31
problem areas are: criteria air pollutants, hazardous air pollu
tants, contaminants in drinking water, abandoned hazardous
waste (e.g., Superfund) sites, pesticide residues on food, and
worker exposures to toxic chemicals. Other ways of slicing the
pie were possible; for example by pollutant, by route o f expo
sure, by source category or by environmental medium. We
thought it most important to define our units in terms corre
sponding roughly to program priority decisions.
Second, we considered four different types of risk for each
problem area: cancer risks, non-cancer health risks< ecologi
cal effects, and welfare effects (visibility impairment, materi
* U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office o f Policy Analysis, Unfinished
B u s in e s s : A Com parative A s s e s s m e n t o j Environm ental Problem s,
Washington, D.C., Feburaiy, 1987.
** U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Magnitude and Nature o f the Air
Toxics Problem in the United States, Washington, D.C., September, 1984.
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als damage, etc.). Each type of risk was analyzed separately.
There were no decisions that one type was more important
than another, and we made no attempt to "add" risks for a
problem area across the four risk types.
Third, in view o f the already massive scope o f the project,
we decided to limit it by not considering:
•
the econom ic or technical controllability o f the
risks;
•
the qualitative aspects o f the risks that people find
important, such as the degree to which the risks are voluntary,
familiar, or equitable;
•
the benefits to society of the activities that cause the
risks; and
•
the statutory and public mandate (or lack thereof) for
EPA to deal with the risks.
These decisions about where to limit the scope of the study and
where not to were carefully considered. In order to provide a
broad guide to EPA priority-setting, we thought it critical to
include w ithin the study all issue areas that EPA m ight
potentially address, and all types o f risk that EPA generally
seeks to abate. The study scope thus includes some areas that
are primarily the province of other agencies (e.g., risks from
exposure to consumer products addressed by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission) and some areas for which EPA
has no clear statutory authority (e.g., indoor air pollution). On
the other hand, the decision to limit the project scope by not
considering the controllability of the risks both made the
project more manageable and, by making the results fall short
o f translating directly into recommended agency priorities,
made the project less threatening to participants.
Finally, because the intent o f the project was to indentify
areas of unfinished business for EPA, we assessed risks as they
exist now—given the levels o f controls that are currently in
place. We did not aim to assess risks that have been abated by
EPA's programs or that will be abated by EPA’s programs when
fu ll com pliance with current regulatory requirem ents is
achieved. This decision again had the effect o f stopping the
study results short o f directly guiding agency priorities. By
looking at existing or residual risks we gained an idea of what
more the agency could aim to accomplish with additional ef
forts in various program areas, but we did not examine what
would be lost if the agency reduced its efforts in these areas. To
the extent that priority-setting involves both investments in
some areas and disinvestments in others, the results o f the
CAEP directly inform only the investment decision portion of
the process.
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The method we used to compare environmental problem
areas can best be described as systematically generating in
formed judgm ents among agency experts. About 75 career
managers and experts representing all EPA programs partici
pated in four work groups (one for each of the four types of risk)
over a period of about nine months. The participants assem
bled and analyzed masses of existing data on pollutants, expo
sures and effects, but ultimately had to fill substantial gaps in
available data by using their collective judgment. In this sense,
the project represents expert opinion rather than objective and
quantitative analysis.
In retrospect, the project involved more judgment and less
objective analysis than was expected. The quantity and quality
of available information were worse than was hoped; in effect
the agency knows in a precise way much less about environ
mental problems than it should. An illustrative example of the
interplay between data and judgment occurred when the health
work groups tried to assess risks associated with the hazardous
air pollutant problem area. Reasonably good data exists on
emissions, exposures, and effects for some 30 hazardous air
pollutants. Health risks from these chemicals could be as
sessed objectively as moderately high in comparison to other
environmental problems. However, there are hundreds or even
thousands of potential additional chemicals that could be
classified as hazardous air pollutants, for which very limited
or no data exist. If the roughly 30 well-understood chemicals
constitute a moderately high health risk, how large is the en
tire hazardous air pollutant problem when the additional
chemicals are considered also? Are the 30 chemicals only the
tip of the hazardous air pollutant iceberg? Or are the 30 known
chemicals far worse than the others (perhaps because EPA has
chosen to generate data first on the worst of all the hazardous
air pollutants)? The work groups had to use their judgment, in
formed by widely scattered data, to answer questions like this
in assessing the risks due to the entire hazardous air pollutant
problem.
In addition to data deficiencies, the work group also had
to contend with methodological difficulties. Standard assess
ment methods existed for cancer health effects and for welfare
effects, but new approaches had to be improvised for ecological
risks and non-cancer health effects. Difficult questions of
ground rules had to be resolved (e.g., should risks that occur far
in the future be discounted relative to those occurring today?).
Overlaps and inconsistencies were discovered in the list of 31
problem areas (e.g., should leachate from a hazardous waste
site that contaminates groundwater used for drinking be
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classed as a hazardous waste problem, a drinking water prob
lem, or both?).
Despite the difficulties, participants in the project ex
pressed confidence in their final relative rankings. They be
lieve that there really are substantial differences in risk across
m ajor environmental problem areas, and that the relative
rankings reflect the gist of these differences. Although the
leaps o f judgments and manipulation of limited data were ini
tially very disturbing for many of the scientists on the work
groups, by the end of the process the participants felt satisfied
with the process they had created to rank the problem areas
and with the results of the process.
FINDINGS OF THE COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT PROJECT
The major findings of the project are rankings o f the 31
problem areas for each of four types o f risk. The rankings are
based on risks existing today, assuming that current controls
stay in place. We found the following:
•
No problems rank relatively high in all four types of
risk, or relatively low in all four. W hether an environmental
problem appears large or not depends critically on the type of
adverse effect with which one is concerned.
•
Problems that rank relatively high in three o f four
risk types, or at least medium in all four include: criteria air
pollutants; stratospheric ozone depletion; pesticide residues on
food; and other pesticide risks (runoff and air deposition o f
pesticides).
•
Problems that rank relatively high in cancer and
non-cancer health risks but low in ecological and welfare risks
include: hazardous air pollutants; indoor radon; indoor air
pollution other than radon; pesticide application; exposure to
consumer products; and worker exposures to chemicals.
•
Problems that rank relatively high in ecological and
welfare risks, but low in both health risks include: global
warming; point and non-point sources of surface water pollu
tion; and physical alteration of aquatic habitats (including es
tuaries and wetlands) and mining.
•
Areas related to groundw ater consistently rank
medium or low. These include active hazardous waste (RCRA)
sites, inactive hazardous waste (Superfund) sites, municipal
and industrial non-hazardous waste sites, releases from stor
age tanks, and other groundwater contamination.
The rankings by risk do not correspond very well with
EPA’s current program priorities. Areas o f relatively high risk
but low EPA effort include: indoor radon; indoor air pollution;
stratospheric ozone depletion; global warming; pesticides
risks; accidental releases o f toxics; consumer projects; and
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worker exposures. Areas o f high EPA effort but relatively
medium or low risks include: RCRA sites; Superfund; under
ground storage tanks; and municipal non-hazardous waste
sites.
This divergence between what we found in terms o f rela
tive risks and EPA’s priorities is not necessarily inappropri
ate. Some problems appear to pose relatively low risks pre
cisely because of high levels of program effort that have been
devoted to controlling them, for example surface water pollu
tion by industry and municipalities. These high levels o f
attention may remain necessary in order to hold risks to cur
rent levels. In other areas, notably those relating to hazardous
or solid waste, current risks appear low even without large his
torical amounts o f effort having been devoted to their control.
Overall, EPA’s priorities appear more closely aligned with
public opinion than with our estimated risks. Recent national
polling data rank areas of concern about environmental issues
as follows:
•
High: chemical waste disposal, water pollution,
chemical plant accidents, and air pollution;
•
Medium: oil spills, worker exposure, pesticides, and
drinking water;
•
Low: indoor air pollution, consumer products, radia
tion (except nuclear power), and global warming.
A final item resulting from the project is the agenda it has
given EPA for improving data and methods for performing en
vironmental risk assessments. We have found it impossible to
perform this project in a quantitatively rigorous fashion. The
best information we have is on the environmental causes of
cancer, but it is weak even here. There is a general lack o f in
formation on and attention to welfare and ecological effects.
Members of both the ecological and the welfare work groups
felt that EPA has paid too little attention to these sorts of con
cerns relative to human health. Exposure data are often poor
in all four areas, even in problem areas where major regula
tory efforts are under way. No generally accepted methods exist
for assessing ecological or non-cancer health effects.
THE IMPACT OF THE STUDY AND THE NEXT STEPS
The CAEP was designed to avoid several of the shortcom
ings that typify priority-setting at EPA:
•
The CRP aimed explicity to compare environmental
problem areas with each other. Problems were not addressed in
isolation. Methods were developed and information was ob
tained specifically to allow relative comparisons of the differ
ent problem areas.
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•
The analysis was not limited to increments or mar
gins. Entire problem areas were compared with each other.
•
The analysis focused on the ultimate impacts o f en
vironm ental problems. Where accepted methods o f analysis
did not already exist, new methods were developed that allowed
participants to focus on these ultimate rather than intermedi
ate impacts.
•
The analysis was not constrained by statutory, pub
lic, or political pressure. It aimed objectively to assess risks,
independently of whether or how those risks ought to be dealt
with. It assessed a broad set o f problem areas, including several
outside of EPA’s direct statutory mandates.
•
The analysis made maximum use o f the expertise and
information within the agency. The participants were EPA's
best and brightest.
But the project still falls well short o f what is needed in
theory for a full guide to priority-setting. The CAEP assessed
only risks and not potential control actions. Allocation o f re
sources among programs should depend on both the possibili
ties for risk reduction and the costs o f achieving it in each
area. Absent an investigation o f controllability, we cannot be
certain that more agency attention to high risk program areas
would represent an improvement over the current agency allo
cation of resources.
Despite not having done an explicit analysis o f controlla
bility, we strongly suspect that resource reallocation is desir
able toward program areas identified in the CAEP as high
risk/low EPA effort. This depends on two propositions. First,
we suspect that spending in each program area shows a pattern
o f declining marginal product; that the first actions under
taken in a program area are the most cost-effective and subse
quent actions are progressively less so. Secondly, we suspect
that the initial program actions in any high risk program area
are in an absolute sense extremely cost-effective, whether or
not the area is amenable to traditional regulatory controls. At
a minimum, research and development, public education, and
legislative development are probably very profitable initial
steps. In sum, although we have not done the supporting
analysis, we felt that additional (or perhaps even initial)
spending in high risk/low effort areas is likely to be more
worthwhile than additional spending in low risk/high effort
program areas.
Finally, in a practical sense the CAEP does not provide a
full guide to priority-setting. Priorities in an administrative
agency cannot depend solely on the agency's expert judgment of
the cost and benefits o f different investment opportunities.
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Statutory mandates, public perceptions and political pressures
are also critical influences.
The major hope for the study outside of EPA was that it
would be viewed as a credible attempt to enhance environmen
tal priority-setting. The specific findings were of concern, but
equally important was to prompt a broader and better in
formed debate (especially in the political arena) about envi
ronmental priorities. And, we hoped that the debate would fo
cus heavily on risks and opportunities to reduce risks in dif
ferent environmental areas.
We believe the process followed by the EPA in its CAEP
provides a useful model for other government agencies also. It
is desirable for all government agencies to focus their re
sources efficiently on achieving their fundamental missions.
Objective analysis to compare the magnitudes of the problems
an agency might deal with, public debate of these findings, and
consequent reordering of priorities are important steps toward
this goal.

